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Abstract	
The	rights	afforded	to	Indigenous	Australians	under	the	Native	Title	Act	1993	(NTA)	are	very	
limited	and	allow	for	undue	coercion	by	corporate	interests,	contrary	to	the	claims	of	many	
prominent	authors	in	this	field.	Unlike	the	Commonwealth’s	first	land	rights	law,	Aboriginal	
Lands	Rights	(Northern	Territory)	Act	1976	(ALRA)	,	the	NTA	does	not	offer	a	right	of	veto	to	
Aboriginal	 parties;	 instead,	 they	 have	 a	 right	 to	 negotiate	 with	 developers,	 which	 has	 in	
practice	meant	very	 little	 leverage	 in	negotiations	 for	native	title	parties.	And	unlike	ALRA,	
developers	can	deal	with	any	 Indigenous	corporation,	rather	 than	 land	councils.	These	 two	
factors	 have	 encouraged	 opportunistic	 conduct	 by	 some	 developers	 and	 led	 to	 vexatious	
litigation	 designed	 to	 break	 the	 resistance	 of	 native	 title	 parties,	 as	 demonstrated	 by	 the	
experience	 of	 Aboriginal	 corporations	 in	 the	 iron	 ore‐rich	 Pilbara	 region	 of	 Western	
Australia.	
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Introduction	
Some	leading	academics	 in	Australia	have	argued	that	 the	rise	of	the	minerals	sector	over	the	
past	decade,	combined	with	legislative	reforms	by	state	and	federal	governments,	have	created	
unprecedented	opportunities	to	transform	the	lives	of	Indigenous	Australians.	Moreover,	some	
Indigenous	academics,	 such	as	Langton	and	Mazel	 (2012:	26),	say	 that	 these	 institutional	and	
cultural	 changes	 have	 been	 transformative.	 A	 number	 of	 law	 academics	 with	 recognised	
expertise	 in	 this	 area	have	 strongly	 endorsed	 the	 view	 that	 the	 institution	 of	 native	 title	 law,	
together	with	corporate	social	responsibility,	has	vastly	improved	the	situation	for	Indigenous	
Australians	faced	with	industrial	resources	developments	often	on	a	massive	scale.	For	instance,	
Tehan	 and	 Godden	 (2012:	 127)	 maintain	 that	 ‘recognition	 of	 native	 title	 has	 had	 a	
transformative	effect	on	relationships	between	Indigenous	peoples	and	the	resources	sector’.		
	
The	 iron	 ore	mining	 operations	 in	 the	 Pilbara	 region	 are	 cited	 especially	 as	 a	 place	 of	 great	
potential	 for	 disadvantaged	 Aborigines	 who	 have	 for	 decades	 been	 marginalised	 by	 mineral	
developments.	 Langton	 and	 Mazel	 (2012)	 have	 highlighted	 the	 role	 of	 mining	 companies	
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operating	 in	 the	Pilbara	–	 such	as	Rio	Tinto	which	now	employs	more	 than	1,500	Aborigines,	
along	 with	 BHP	 Billiton	 and	 Fortescue	Metals	 Group	 –	 asserting	 that	 Indigenous	 jobs	 in	 the	
mining	industry	have	been	a	critical	part	of	the	socio‐economic	transformation	of	Aborigines.	
	
Academics	have	emphasised	employment	 gains	 by	 Indigenous	people	because	 these	numbers	
are	more	 readily	measurable.	However,	much	 less	 is	known	about	 the	agreements	negotiated	
between	 mining	 companies	 and	 Indigenous	 communities,	 such	 as	 the	 financial	 terms	 and	
income	flows.	Despite	claims	of	practicing	corporate	social	responsibility,	resources	companies	
invariably	insist	on	and	usually	obtain	strict	confidentiality	in	these	negotiations.	In	reality,	little	
is	known	about	the	outcome	of	these	agreements	so	there	is	in	fact	minimal	evidence	to	support	
claims	about	the	benefits	of	native	title	to	Indigenous	communities.	This	is	contrary	to	practices	
in	 the	 1970s,	 before	 the	 advent	 of	 federal	 native	 title	 law,	 when	 it	 was	 possible	 to	 obtain	
extensive	details	of	agreements	reached	in	the	Northern	Territory	(Altman	1983).	Thus,	despite	
so‐called	 improvements	 in	 legal	 institutions,	 there	 is	 less	 transparency	 today	 in	 native	 title	
negotiations	than	previously	even	though	this	attribute	is	meant	to	be	one	of	the	hallmarks	of	
the	neoliberal	tradition.	
	
This	paper	demonstrates	how	the	procedures	and	institutions	set	up	under	the	Native	Title	Act	
1993	(NTA)	to	deal	with	native	title,	together	with	state	heritage	laws,	provides	a	clear	benefit	
to	developers,	 and	 that	 these	 advantages	are	magnified	by	 the	 substantial	 financial	 resources	
that	companies	have	available	compared	with	those	of	native	title	parties.	The	NTA’s	provisions	
do	not	 limit	 the	 use	 of	 aggressive	 and	opportunistic	 behaviour	 by	 companies;	 in	 fact,	 I	 argue	
they	actually	encourage	it.	While	gaining	 legal	recognition	of	native	title	to	traditional	 lands	is	
complex,	 cumbersome	 and	 costly	 for	 native	 title	 parties,	 developers	 can	 generally	 bank	 on	
getting	timely	access	to	those	same	lands	when	they	are	sought	for	development.	Furthermore,	
the	nature	of	the	NTA	is	likely	to	be	divisive	for	native	title	groups	especially	when	a	developer	
chooses	 to	 provide	 financial	 support	 to	 one	 favoured	 faction	 within	 a	 multi‐party	 language	
group.	In	such	situations,	an	opportunistic	company	can	divide	and	conquer	a	group	and	remain	
within	the	law,	even	though	such	actions	could	be	considered	a	breach	of	the	principle	of	good	
faith	in	negotiations,	as	required	by	section	31	of	the	NTA.	
	
The	 case	 study	 discussed	 in	 this	 paper	 is	 a	 long‐running	 dispute	 between	 the	 Yindjibarndi	
people	of	 the	Pilbara	region	and	Fortescue	Metals	Group	(FMG).	Close	scrutiny	of	this	dispute	
raises	 questions	 about	 claims	 that	 the	 NTA	 is	 a	 more	 efficient	 and	 equitable	 framework	 for	
resolving	disputes	between	native	title	parties	and	developers.	One	objective	of	the	legislation	
as	outlined	by	former	Prime	Minister	Paul	Keating	in	his	second	reading	speech	on	the	Native	
Title	 Bill	 in	 November	 1993	 was	 for	 individual	 claimants	 or	 groups	 to	 be	 freed	 from	 the	
monopoly	of	land	councils	which	operate	in	the	Northern	Territory	under	ALRA.	He	declared:		
	
We	will	therefore	under	the	bill,	determine	representative	Aboriginal	and	Torres	
Strait	 Islander	organisations	 to	assist	claimants.	They	will	not	have	a	monopoly	
on	 representing	 native	 title	 claimants:	 individual	 claimants	 or	 groups	 of	
claimants	can	go	elsewhere	if	they	wish.	(Keating	in	McKenna	1995:	3)	
	
But	the	corollary	of	this	argument,	as	this	case	study	demonstrates,	is	that	developers	can	also	
go	elsewhere	if	they	find	that	a	native	title	party	does	not	agree	with	their	level	of	compensation	
or	general	approach	to	development.	
	
Neoclassical	theorists	who	have	examined	the	NTA	argue	that	it	offers	a	better	way	of	achieving	
market	 efficiency.	 As	 observed	 by	McKenna,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 land	 council	 organisations	 can	
achieve	‘economies	of	scale’	because	of	their	size	while,	on	the	other	hand,	the	NTA’s	framework	
allows	smaller	groups	to	negotiate	directly	with	miners,	potentially	leading	to	better	economic	
outcomes.	 These	 outcomes	 arose	 because	 ‘there	 will	 therefore	 be	 a	 greater	 chance	 that	
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Aborigines’	valuation	of	their	land	will	be	accurately	reflected	in	the	body	corporate's	decision	
whether	 to	 negotiate	 a	 mining	 agreement’	 (McKenna	 1995:	 11).	 However,	 there	 is	 little	
evidence	 to	 support	 the	 notion	 that	 the	 ALRA	 regime,	 especially	 its	 land	 councils	 and	 local	
communities’	rights	of	veto,	has	been	responsible	for	poor	economic	outcomes.	For	many	years	
the	 mining	 industry	 in	 the	 Northern	 Territory	 has	 represented	 a	 major	 share	 of	 that	
jurisdiction’s	 economy,	 contributing	 more	 than	 20	 per	 cent	 of	 gross	 product.	 This	 level	 of	
resource	sector	activity	is	second	only	to	that	of	Western	Australia,	and	far	ahead	of	the	other	
five	Australian	states.	In	fact,	evidence	presented	in	this	case	study	indicates	that	the	absence	of	
strong	 institutional	 support	 for	 Indigenous	 claimants	 has	meant	 that	 one	 faction	 has	 grossly	
undervalued	their	land	which	has	led	to	a	substantially	inferior	outcome	than	might	have	been	
achieved.	
	
Methodology	and	theoretical	framework	
This	paper	focuses	on	a	single	dispute	over	access	to	land	targeted	for	an	iron	ore	mine	worth	as	
much	 as	 $10	 billion2	 in	 gross	 annual	 production	 value	 to	 highlight	 many	 problems	 faced	 by	
Indigenous	communities	in	attempting	to	exercise	their	rights	under	relevant	state	and	federal	
laws.	The	dispute	between	the	Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	Corporation	(YAC)	and	FMG	brings	into	
sharp	focus	the	governance	arrangements	within	which	Indigenous	people	in	Australia	have	to	
work.	 YAC’s	 vigorous	 pursuit	 of	 rights	 enshrined	 in	 the	 UN	 Declaration	 of	 the	 Rights	 of	
Indigenous	 Peoples,	 combined	 with	 FMG's	 aggressive	 approach	 to	 securing	 development	
approvals,	helps	to	make	this	a	highly	instructive	case	study.	
	
The	methodological	approach	used	relied	heavily	but	not	solely	on	interviews	with	many	within	
the	Yindjibarndi	community	on	opposing	sides	of	the	dispute,	along	with	a	substantial	amount	
of	 sourced	 documentation.	 The	 author	 used	 the	 federal	 Freedom	of	 Information	 (FoI)	 law	 to	
obtain	 a	 series	 of	 documents.	 Additionally,	 material	 amassed	 by	 YAC	 using	 the	 Western	
Australian	FoI	law	and	elsewhere	was	made	available	to	the	author.	Some	of	this	material	is	in	
the	form	of	confidential	documents	and	emails	that	reveal	a	great	deal	about	the	extent	to	which	
corporate	 interests	 are	 able	 to	 exploit	 weaknesses	 in	 relevant	 laws.	 This	 information	 is	
complemented	by	publicly	available	documents	such	as	records	of	appearances	before	judicial	
and	 administrative	 bodies	 which	 permit	 an	 appreciation	 of	 the	 level	 of	 contestation	 in	 this	
dispute.	
	
Along	with	other	considerations,	 the	author	carefully	assessed	the	 language	used	by	FMG	and	
the	 values	 embedded	 in	 the	 statements	 and	 presentations	 made	 by	 company	 executives	 in	
relation	 to	 this	 dispute.	 The	 corporate	 culture	 that	 emerged	 inside	 FMG	 is	 explored	 through	
scrutiny	of	the	ways	in	which	earlier	negotiations	with	a	community	of	traditional	owners	in	the	
Pilbara	 were	 conducted	 and	 through	 examination	 of	 subsequent	 negotiations	 with	 YAC.	 The	
framing	 of	 debates	 on	 justice	 and	 compensation	 is	 a	 prominent	 dynamic	 in	 this	 case	 study,	
which	in	turn	brings	into	focus	the	power	imbalances	that	exist	between	companies	and	native	
title	 parties.	 In	 understanding	 and	 interpreting	 these	 dynamics,	 theories	 of	 justice	 are	
important.	 However,	 this	 case	 study	 highlights	 the	 limitations	 of	 conventional	 theories	 of	
justice,	 such	 as	 those	 in	 the	 Rawlsian	 tradition	 (Rawls	 1971),	 and	 thus	 underscores	 the	
significance	 of	 theories	 of	 justice	 as	 outlined	 by	Nancy	 Fraser	 (Fraser	 2009)	 and	 Iris	Marion	
Young	 (1990)	 that	 focus	 on	 concepts	 of	 recognition	 and	 oppression.	 Fraser	 in	 particular	
strongly	 argued	 that	 justice	 involves	 recognition	 of	 rights	 as	 well	 as	 redistribution.	 Fraser’s	
theoretical	 framework	 resonates	 in	 this	 dispute	 given	 that	 a	 powerful	 corporate	 interest	was	
able	 to	 frame	 –	 or	 indeed	mis‐frame	 –	 the	 debate	 about	 what	 constitutes	 fair	 and	 equitable	
outcomes.	FMG	was	able	to	dismiss	as	 ‘mining	welfare’	YAC’s	 legitimate	demand	under	native	
title	law	for	fair	compensation.	In	comments	that	echo	the	influence	of	FMG	in	effectively	setting	
the	parameters	of	the	negotiations	and	in	defining	the	solutions	to	Indigenous	disadvantage	in	
national	 debates,	 Fraser	 argued	 that	 'misframing'	 involves	 denying	 a	 voice	 and	 the	 ability	 to	
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press	 first‐order	claims.	 (Fraser	2009:	19‐20)	This	paper	argues	 that	 the	dispute	between	 the	
Yindjibarndi	people	and	FMG	corroborates	Fraser’s	arguments.	This	assertion	 is	borne	out	by	
the	behaviour	of	some	Yindjibarndi	elders	even	to	the	point	where	those	elders	who	supported	
FMG	 would	 defer	 questions	 about	 the	 dispute	 to	 company	 consultants,	 effectively	 making	
themselves	non‐persons	with	respect	to	speaking	about	their	rights.	
	
Key	NTA	provisions,	institutions	and	issues	
A	new	administrative	body,	the	National	Native	Title	Tribunal	(NNTT)	was	created	by	Part	6	of	
the	NTA.	The	NNTT	was	established	by	the	federal	government	on	1	January	1994,	at	the	same	
time	 as	 the	 NTA	 received	 Royal	 Assent.	 This	 body	 is	 responsible	 for	 registering	 claims	 and	
dealing	promptly	and	efficiently	with	negotiations	where	an	agreement	had	not	been	reached	
after	 the	 prescribed	 period	 of	 six	 months.	 The	 Tribunal	 is	 not	 a	 court	 and	 does	 not	 decide	
whether	native	 title	exists	or	does	not	exist.	This	role	 is	 left	 to	 the	Federal	Court	of	Australia.	
However,	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Tribunal	 and	 its	 Members	 make	 arbitral	 decisions,	 chiefly	 in	
relation	to	 ‘future	act’	matters	when	parties	have	been	unable	to	reach	an	agreement.	The	so‐
called	future	act	regime	set	up	by	the	NTA	allows	developers	and	native	title	parties	to	conduct	
negotiations	even	where	native	title	claims	are	yet	to	be	resolved.	When	an	agreement	cannot	
be	reached	after	six	months,	the	matter	then	goes	to	the	NNTT	for	arbitration.	Thus,	the	regime	
is	designed	to	remove	uncertainty	for	developers.	To	date,	these	matters	have	mainly	involved	
mining	proposals.		
	
In	 addition	 to	 arbitration,	 the	 NNTT's	 Native	 Title	 Registrar	 has	 a	 procedural	 role	 with	
responsibility	 for	 making	 administrative	 decisions	 about	 the	 registration	 of	 claimant	
applications	 and	 Indigenous	 Land	 Use	 Agreements,	 which	 came	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	
amendments	introduced	in	1998	(NNTT	2005).	According	to	Strelein	(2009:	6),	a	leading	native	
title	analyst,	the	process	managed	by	the	NNTT	puts	native	title	applicants	on	the	back	foot	from	
the	 outset	 because	 it	 ‘sets	 native	 title	 applicants	 in	 the	 position	 of	 having	 to	 “explain”	 their	
claims,	to	assert	legitimacy	and	to	ask	for	recognition	from	potentially	hundreds	of	“interested”	
parties	 and	 often	 recalcitrant	 state	 governments’.	 The	 skepticism	 among	 some	 Aboriginal	
people	about	the	role	of	the	NTA	as	a	facilitator	of	development	rather	than	of	Indigenous	rights	
is	 supported	 by	 Strelein	who	 says	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	NTA	were	 ‘primarily	 directed	 to	 the	
impact	on	the	granting	of	mining	leases’.	In	its	short	history,	the	NNTT	has	presided	over	more	
than	 3,028	 future	 act	 decisions3	 and	 found	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Indigenous	 party	 on	 just	 three	
occasions.		
	
For	native	title	parties,	a	pivotal	element	of	the	NTA	creates	the	right	to	good	faith	negotiations	
(Section	31(1)	(b)).	This	is	deemed	to	be	a	‘special	right’	although	it	is	in	fact	the	only	right	given	
to	 native	 title	 parties	 under	 this	 regime	 and	 it	 can	 often	 prove	 to	 be	 of	 little	 value.	 In	
determining	whether	the	negotiations	have	been	conducted	in	good	faith,	the	tribunal	has	asked	
if	 the	 parties	 acted	 ‘honestly	 and	 reasonably’	 and	 has	 developed	 ‘indicia’	 of	 what	 might	 be	
regarded	as	bad	faith,	such	as	the	adoption	of	a	rigid	negotiating	position	or	the	failure	to	make	
counter	offers	(Burnside	2009:	5)	In	only	a	small	number	of	instances,	however,	has	the	NNTT	
found	a	grantee	or	government	party	to	have	not	acted	in	good	faith.	Burnside	put	the	number	
at	four	out	of	30	alleged	instances	of	bad	faith.	
	
A	number	of	cases	before	the	Federal	Court	and	the	Tribunal	involving	FMG	has	found	in	favour	
of	the	company.	In	the	case	where	FMG’s	proposed	lease	area	overlapped	part	of	the	area	of	one	
Indigenous	 claimant	 application	 and	 also	 part	 of	 another	 Indigenous	 group’s	 Determination	
Area	(FMG	Pilbara	Ltd	v	Cox	[2009]	FCAFC	49),	the	Full	Federal	Court	demonstrated,	according	
to	Burnside	(2009:	11),	that	negotiations	in	good	faith	(s31	of	the	NTA)	‘will	be	satisfied	by	all	
but	the	most	extreme	negotiation	tactics’.	Burnside	added	that	an	application	for	special	leave	to	
appeal	FMG	 v	Cox	was	 refused	 by	 the	High	Court	 in	October	 2009.	 The	NNTT	 again	 found	 in	
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favour	of	FMG	in	2011	in	a	case	 involving	the	Yamatji	Marlpa	Aboriginal	Corporation	(YMAC),	
which	 was	 acting	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 Njamal	 People	 (see	 Fortescue	Metals	 Group	 Ltd/Western	
Australia/Taylor	 [2011]	NNTTA	66).	This	case	acknowledged	 that	 land	access	 lawyer	Sukhpal	
Singh	was	engaged	by	FMG	even	though	he	had	previously	worked	for	YMAC,	firstly	as	a	senior	
legal	officer	and	then	as	deputy	principal	legal	officer,	for	almost	three	years	to	September	2008.	
The	NNTT	member	Daniel	O'Dea	found,	however,	that	no	confidential	materials	were	identified	
as	being	in	Singh’s	possession,	and	nor	had	YMAC	identified	any	information	that	was	at	risk	of	
disclosure	by	Singh	to	the	grantee	party.		
	
The	deficiencies	 in	s.	31	 led	the	 former	Federal	Labor	government	to	propose	amendments	 in	
the	form	of	the	Native	Title	Amendment	Bill	2012	which	proposed	a	reverse	onus	of	proof	on	
good	 faith	 negotiations,	 and	 an	 increase	 in	 the	minimum	negotiation	 period	 to	 eight	months.	
The	Bill,	however,	was	held	up	in	a	Committee	inquiry	at	the	time	of	the	2013	election	and	was	
never	passed	into	law.	
	
The	Yindjibarndi	people	
After	 inhabiting	 the	 high	 country	 of	 the	 Pilbara	 region	 of	 Western	 Australia	 for	 tens	 of	
thousands	 of	 years,	 most	 Yindjibarndi	 people	 now	 live	 in	 the	 town	 of	 Roebourne	 and	
surrounding	 outstations.	 Roebourne,	 located	 just	 39km	 from	 the	 affluent	 mining	 town	 of	
Karratha,	has	been	symbolic	of	 Indigenous	exploitation,	disadvantage	and	despair	 in	Australia	
for	decades.	During	the	first	century	of	white	settlement	 in	the	region	it	was	used	as	a	hub	to	
subjugate	the	Indigenous	population	and	such	oppression	has	continued	into	recent	times.	The	
September	 1983	 death	 of	 16‐year‐old	 Yindjibarndi	 boy	 John	 Peter	 Pat	 at	 the	 hands	 of	 local	
police	 led	 to	 a	 Royal	 Commission	 into	 Aboriginal	 deaths	 in	 custody.	 Today,	 one	 of	 the	major	
pieces	of	 new	 infrastructure	 in	Roebourne	 is	a	prison	opened	 in	March	1984	which	has	been	
continually	 expanded	 since	 then.	 Located	 just	 5km	 from	 the	 town	 centre,	 its	 operational	
capacity	of	161	inmates	is	regularly	exceeded.	This	prison	for	the	Pilbara	and	Kimberly	regions	
has	 ‘a	 high	 percentage	 of	 Aboriginal	 prisoners’	 (Department	 of	 Corrective	 Services	 2013).	 In	
fact,	the	prison	population	is	more	than	80	per	cent	Indigenous.	
	
Despite	 the	 overwhelming	poverty	 and	disadvantage	 experienced	by	 the	Yindjibarndi	 people,	
they	formed	their	own	corporation	under	Federal	law	in	1994,	just	three	months	after	the	NTA	
received	 Royal	 Assent.	 Under	 the	 native	 title	 law,	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 Aboriginal	 Corporation	 is	
known	as	a	prescribed	body	corporate,	which	means	that	it	holds	native	title	rights	and	acts	on	
behalf	of	 the	Yindjibarndi	people	when	dealing	with	native	 title	matters.4	YAC’s	 incorporation	
coincided	with	 discussions	 among	 the	Ngarluma	 and	 Yindjibarndi	 people	 that	were	 aimed	 at	
lodging	 a	 native	 title	 claim	 and	 were	 led	 by	 the	 former	 Premier	 of	Western	 Australia,	 Peter	
Dowding,	in	the	town	of	Roebourne.	 
	
On	 December	 20,	 1994,	 the	 NNTT	 formally	 registered	 the	 Ngarluma‐Yindjibarndi	 land	 claim.	
Registration	 of	 a	 claim	 is	 a	 significant	milestone	 for	 native	 title	 groups	 because	 claims	must	
meet	12	conditions	specified	in	the	NTA.	As	a	result,	registration	carries	with	it	 implicit	rights	
and	is	considered	to	be	 just	as	 important	as	obtaining	a	determination	because	 it	can	provide	
the	 basis	 for	 negotiations	 with	 developers.	 Almost	 a	 decade	 later,	 on	 3	 July	 2003,	 Justice	
Nicholson	 granted	 a	 determination	 of	 Native	 Title	 to	 these	 two	 peoples	 in	 the	 form	 of	 non‐
exclusive	 possession	 and	 designated	 YAC	 as	 the	 prescribed	 body	 corporate	 for	 its	 successful	
claim	(Daniel	v	Western	Australia	[2003]	FCA	666	18).	Just	one	week	after	Nicholson	issued	his	
native	 title	 determination,	 YAC	 submitted	 a	 new	 claim	 to	 the	 NNTT	 in	 an	 area	 adjoining	 the	
Determination	Area.	 This	 became	 known	 as	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 #1	Native	 Title	 claim	 for	which	
YAC	is	technically	known	as	the	agent	to	the	claim	Applicant.	
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Map	1:	The	Ngarluma	Determination	Area	in	brown;	the	Yindjibarndi	Determination	Area	is	below	
it	 in	white	 (overlaid	with	mineral	 exploration	 and	development	 leases	 in	 red);	 and	 the	
adjoining	Yindjibarndi	#1	Native	Title	Claim	area	is	below	the	green	line.		
Source:	Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	Corporation	
	
The	FMG	way	
Shortly	 after	 the	 July	 2003	 decision	 in	 which	 Nicholson	 found	 in	 favour	 of	 the	 Yindjibarndi	
people,	FMG	began	staking	out	 ‘landholdings’	 in	 the	Pilbara	 that	reached	 into	 land	claimed	by	
YAC	 and	 subsequently	 registered	 with	 the	 NNTT	 in	 2005.	 From	 2003	 onwards,	 FMG	 began	
lodging	applications	for	exploration	rights	in	both	the	Yindjibarndi	Determination	Area	and	the	
claim	 area.	 Specifically,	 between	 16	 October	 2003	 and	 13	 February	 2006,	 FMG	 lodged	 19	
applications	for	exploration	licences	in	the	Determination	Area	and	a	further	18	in	the	area	of	
the	Yindjibarndi	#1	Native	Title	Claim	(Irving	2012:	2).	The	company	made	these	applications	
even	though	it	was	focused	on	developing	its	first	iron	ore	mines	in	another	part	of	the	Pilbara	
region.	
	
The	ethos	and	operational	modus	of	FMG	and	its	founder	Andrew	Forrest	are	an	important	part	
of	 any	 study	 of	 this	 company.	 In	 the	 space	 of	 five	 years,	 Forrest	 transformed	 a	 small	 listed	
company	with	a	handful	of	prospects	into	a	major	iron	ore	exporter.	A	key	part	of	the	company's	
success	 has	 relied	 on	 a	 very	 strict	 approach	 to	 costs	 and	 efficiency,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	
investing	 significant	 resources	 in	 acquiring	 tenements	 throughout	 the	 Pilbara	 region	 that	
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overlap	 native	 title	 land	 and	 claim	 areas.	 FMG	 has	 taken	 a	 different	 approach	 to	 land	 access	
agreements	with	traditional	owners	to	that	of	established	iron	ore	producers	Rio	Tinto	and	BHP	
Billiton	in	that	it	has	emphasised	jobs	and	training	for	Indigenous	Australians	and	used	highly	
loaded	 language	 to	dismiss	 financial	 compensation	such	as	 labelling	 it	 ‘mining	welfare’.	When	
Traditional	 Owners	 have	 rejected	 FMG’s	 offers	 of	 low	 compensation,	 the	 company	 has	
responded	with	an	aggressive	campaign	of	litigation	aimed	at	breaking	this	resistance	and	thus	
securing	approval	in	a	timely	and	cost‐effective	manner.	
	
In	 July	 2003,	 Andrew	 Forrest	 acquired	 a	 stake	 in	 a	 small	 iron	 ore	 miner,	 Allied	 Mining	 and	
Processing,	which	held	mineral	exploration	leases	in	the	Pilbara,	and	then	changed	the	name	to	
Fortescue	 Metals	 Group,	 reflecting	 the	 heritage	 of	 the	 region	 associated	 with	 his	 great‐great	
uncle,	 the	 former	 Western	 Australia	 Premier	 John	 Forrest.	 Andrew	 Forrest	 acquired	 his	
controlling	stake	in	the	company	for	just	8c	a	share	and,	after	converting	all	of	his	options,	his	
total	 cash	 investment	 of	 $8	million	was,	 by	 January	 2005,	worth	 $400	million	 (Burrell	 2013:	
109).	FMG	then	embarked	on	a	 fast‐track	strategy	of	 securing	 for	 its	new	mines	all	necessary	
approvals	under	state	and	federal	law	within	the	space	of	a	few	years.	
	
An	insight	into	FMG’s	attitude	to	political	processes	was	shown	in	the	way	it	lauded	the	ability	
of	 the	Chinese	government	 to	expedite	projects.	 In	a	2008	shareholder	presentation	company	
executives	said	that	while	‘Australia	is	well‐managed	for	a	free	democratic	society,	China	is	even	
better	able	to	handle	a	crisis	….’	(FMG	2008).	The	presentation	pointed	out	that	the	new	airport	
in	 Beijing	went	 from	 approval	 to	 completion	 in	 three	 years,	 whereas	 the	 new	 Terminal	 5	 at	
Heathrow	airport	in	London	involved	four	years	of	public	consultation	followed	by	six	years	of	
construction	(FMG	2008).	FMG	wanted	 to	adopt	a	similar	approach	to	 the	approvals	required	
for	 its	 new	Pilbara	mines	because	 it	 had	 set	 itself	 an	extremely	 ambitious	 target	of	 achieving	
first	production	by	2008.	
	
FMG’s	applications	for	exploration	leases	throughout	the	Pilbara	were	part	of	a	plan	to	acquire	a	
vast	 number	 of	 potential	 mine	 sites.	 By	 2006,	 it	 had	 already	 accumulated	 32,000	 square	
kilometres	 of	 tenements,	 more	 than	 double	 the	 combined	 tenements	 of	 Rio	 Tinto	 and	 BHP	
Billiton,	 two	companies	 that	had	been	operating	 in	 the	Pilbara	since	 the	1960s.	The	company	
had	even	acquired	exploration	rights	that	extended	out	to	sea	for	about	20	kilometres	along	500	
kilometres	 of	 the	 Pilbara	 coastline.	 FMG	 at	 times	 referred	 to	 these	 exploration	 tenements	 as	
'landholdings'	in	its	shareholder	presentations,	even	though	it	had	no	ownership	of	this	land.	In	
a	February	2006	presentation	to	the	Global	Iron	Ore	and	Steel	Forecast	Conference	the	company	
twice	referred	to	itself	as	an	extensive	'landholder'	in	the	Pilbara	(FMG	2006).	Over	the	next	five	
years,	this	calculated	approach	delivered	the	company	an	additional	50,000	square	kilometres	
of	approved	or	pending	exploration	tenements,	taking	the	total	to	85,000	square	kilometres	by	
2013	(FMG	2013).		
	
FMG’s	 first	 mines	 were	 Cloudbreak	 and	 Christmas	 Creek,	 located	 in	 the	 Pilbara's	 Chichester	
Ranges	 about	 260km	 south	 of	 Port	 Hedland.	 Both	mines	 straddled	 the	 upper	 reaches	 of	 the	
Fortescue	 River	 (see	 Map	 2).	 The	 myriad	 of	 approvals	 required	 to	 open	 this	 mine	 included	
negotiations	with	the	elders	of	four	communities	who	held	native	title	claims	within	the	mining	
lease:	 the	Nyiyaparli;	 the	 Palyku;	 the	Martu	 Idja	 Banyjima;	 an,	 the	 Puutu	Kunti	 Kurrama	 and	
Pinikura	and	Eastern	Guruma	(Priest	2006:	44).	The	company	had	to	negotiate	with	native	title	
groups	in	order	to	obtain	heritage	clearances	under	the	state’s	heritage	laws	and	to	reduce	the	
risk	that	a	successful	native	title	claim	could	be	used	to	secure	compensation	at	a	later	date.		
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Map	2:	FMG's	east	and	west	Pilbara	development	 zones.	The	 Solomon	mines	are	 located	 in	 the	
Yindjibarndi	#	1	Claim	Area.		
Source:	FMG	2014	shareholder	presentation	
	
One	of	 the	 four	groups,	 the	Nyiyaparli,	was	preparing	a	claim	for	36,684	square	kilometres	of	
land	overlapping	the	FMG	tenements.	The	claim	was	registered	with	the	NNTT	on	1	September	
2005	 (NNTT	2005).	 Two	months	 earlier,	 FMG	had	 secured	 an	 agreement	with	 the	Nyiyaparli	
people	by	using	a	tactic	that	might	be	described	as	divisive.	The	four	groups	were	represented	
by	 the	 Pilbara	 Native	 Title	 Service	 (PNTS),	 which	 was	 the	 Pilbara‐based	 subsidiary	 of	 the	
Yamatji	 Marlpa	 Aboriginal	 Corporation	 (YMAC),	 a	 registered	 native	 title	 body	 corporate	 that	
represented	 traditional	owners	 in	negotiations	with	mining	 interests.	Partly	as	a	 result	of	 the	
difficult	 and	drawn‐out	negotiations	with	FMG,	 the	 relationship	between	 the	 four	groups	and	
PNTS	broke	down.	FMG	saw	this	as	an	opportunity	to	broker	a	deal	with	some	of	the	Nyiyaparli	
elders.	Forrest	had	a	relationship	with	one	of	the	six	elders,	the	74‐year‐old	Andrew	Stock,	who	
had	worked	 on	 the	 Forrest	 family’s	Mindaroo	 station	 in	 the	 Pilbara,	where	 Stock	 had	 taught	
Forrest	 and	 his	 brothers	 to	 ride	 horses	 (Priest	 2006:	 44).	 The	 financial	 compensation	 in	 the	
agreement	 amounted	 to	 unindexed	 cash	 payments	 of	 just	 2.5	 cents	 a	 tonne.	 By	 comparison,	
compensation	paid	by	major	Pilbara	iron	ore	producers	BHP	and	Rio	Tinto	has	been	in	the	order	
of	0.5	per	cent	per	tonne,	or	50	cents	per	tonne	when	compared	to	a	benchmark	iron	ore	price	
of	$100	per	tonne.		
	
The	 August	 2005	 agreement	 signed	 by	 Stock	 and	 five	 other	 Nyiyaparli	 native	 title	 claimants	
removed	 significant	 cultural	 heritage	 and	 environmental	 provisions	 that	 had	 been	 agreed	
between	FMG	and	 the	Nyiyaparli	 in	earlier	negotiations,	 and	 it	was	signed	without	 the	elders	
having	 legal	 representation	 present.	 The	 broader	 Nyiyaparli	 claimant	 group	 disavowed	 the	
agreement	 two	weeks	 later,	and	Stock	said	he	had	not	known	what	he	was	agreeing	 to.	Stock	
was	quoted	in	the	media	the	day	after	signing	saying:	 ‘I	didn’t	know	what	was	going	on.	 I	 feel	
like	 they	 made	 me	 sign—they	 kept	 calling	 me	 uncle’.	 (Priest	 2006:	 44)	 He	 added	 that	 the	
company	had	given	him	and	the	five	others	two	brand	new	Toyota	Land	Cruiser	4WD	vehicles	
(with	a	current	value	of	around	$100,000	each).	After	going	through	a	protracted	legal	claim	to	
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gain	native	title,	the	Nyiyaparli	forfeited	their	rights	as	a	result	of	this	agreement	with	Stock	and	
his	associate.		
	
The	approach	 taken	by	FMG	 in	 these	negotiations	with	 the	Nyiyaparli	people	and	subsequent	
ones	 with	 YAC	 was	 outlined	 in	 a	 series	 of	 emails	 sent	 by	 staff	 and	 advisers	 in	 2006	 as	 the	
company	 was	 racing	 towards	 first	 production	 from	 its	 Cloudbreak	 mine.	 The	 emails	 were	
obtained	by	YAC	in	late	2011	and	then	posted	on	its	website	in	August	2012.	YAC	first	referred	
to	them	in	a	press	release	dated	29	August	2012	(YAC	2012).	The	authenticity	of	the	emails	has	
never	 been	 challenged	 by	 FMG	or	 any	 other	 party,	 according	 to	 YAC	Chief	 Executive	Michael	
Woodley.	However,	YAC’s	senior	executives	agreed	to	shut	down	their	website	 in	July	2013	in	
order	 to	move	beyond	 the	dispute	 and	when	 it	 re‐appeared	 the	 emails	 and	other	 documents	
relating	to	the	dispute	with	FMG	had	been	removed.		
	
The	emails	highlight	FMG’s	adoption	of	‘aggressive	strategies’	to	divide	native	title	claim	groups	
and	 undermine	 their	 confidence	 in	 their	 legal	 representative,	 PNTS.	 Instead,	 the	 company	
wanted	 these	 groups	 to	 seek	 new	 legal	 representation	 funded	 by	 FMG.	 The	 emails	 discussed	
‘efforts	 to	 get	 PNTS	 out	 of	 the	 heritage	 picture’	 and	 of	 ‘executing	 a	 multifaceted	 strategy	 to	
counter	PNTS’s	ability	to	impede	[FMG’s]	achievement	of	outcomes	with	the	blackfellas’.	At	the	
heart	was	a	strategy	to	put	PNTS	under	immense	pressure	and	undermine	its	ability	to	organise	
itself	 due	 to	 a	 ‘barrage’	 of	 ‘expedited’	 litigation	 prosecuted	 at	 a	 ‘gruelling	 pace’.	 The	 strategy	
outlined	here	with	 regard	 to	FMG’s	negotiations	with	 the	Nyiyaparli	people	bears	 remarkable	
similarities	to	FMG’s	conduct	in	subsequent	dealings	with	the	Yindjibarndi	people.		
	
Significantly,	the	strategy	included	defamation	actions	against	PNTS,	a	common	feature	of	FMG’s	
approach	with	native	title	advisers	and	the	media.	YAC	later	dismissed	PNTS	because	it	became	
unhappy	 with	 its	 conceding	 to	 FMG	 demands	 such	 as	 expedited	 applications.	 As	 an	 FMG	
executive	explained:	
	
Therefore,	while	we	are	still	exposed	to	PNTS	in	the	short	term,	I	think	it	would	
be	 highly	 advantageous	 to	maintain	 the	 defamation	writs	 against	 PNTS	 and	 its	
operatives.	This	is	consistent	with	the	way	I	have	presented	the	battle	lines	and	
we	 should	 respond	 to	 their	 correspondence	 accordingly.	 (Unpublished	
correspondence	held	by	the	author)	
	
A	September	2005	email	from	a	Perth	lawyer	to	various	FMG	executives	outlined	the	strategy	of	
dealing	 with	 Nyiyaparli	 elders	 Gordon	 Yuline	 and	 David	 Stock	 (unpublished	 correspondence	
dated	1	September;	held	by	author).	The	lawyer	said	that	Yuline	and	Stock	‘were	unhappy	with	
the	current	state	of	affairs	and	wished	to	pursue	a	compromise	with	FMG’.	The	 lawyer	added,	
however,	that	another	FMG‐funded	lawyer	who	was	advising	the	two	was	not	being	sufficiently	
aggressive	in	trying	to	win	hearts	and	minds	in	the	Nyiyaparli	community.	 ‘I	do	not	think	that	
[the	 lawyer]	 is	actively	considering	any	of	our	“aggressive”	strategies.	 I	 think	we	need	to	 take	
the	time	to	explain	the	benefits	of	those	strategies	to	[the	lawyer]	–	to	the	extent	we	believe	it	
will	assist	us’.		
	
It	 was	 around	 this	 time	 that	 FMG	 was	 preparing	 to	 serve	 a	 writ	 on	 PNTS	 for	 ‘unlawful	
interference’.	When	asked	whether	FMG	should	‘push	the	button’	on	legal	action,	a	very	senior	
FMG	executive	responded	by	saying:	 ‘I	am	deeply	in	favour	of	both	expedition	and	serving	the	
writ	next	tuesday	[sic].	Give	[the	lawyer]	one	chance	on	Monday	and	then	go	immediately.	Are	
we	 ready	 to	 go	 now	 or	 do	we	 need	 that	 time	 anyway?’	 (unpublished	 email	 dated	 31	 August	
2005;	held	by	author).	
	
The	Perth	 lawyer	explained	in	an	August	2005	email	 to	FMG’s	 ‘litigation	coordinator’	how	the	
company	 could	 use	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	 NTA	 to	 secure	 the	 agreement	 it	 wanted	 with	 the	
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Nyiyaparli	 people	 (unpublished	 correspondence	 dated	 31	 August;	 held	 by	 author).	 This	
included	 replacing	 the	 members	 of	 the	 Applicant	 to	 the	 claim	 nominated	 by	 the	 Nyiyaparli	
community	with	FMG‐favoured	Applicant	members,	which	is	exactly	the	tactic	used	in	the	later	
dispute	with	YAC.	Replacing	 the	members	of	 the	Applicant	 could	 be	 achieved	by	going	 to	 the	
Federal	Court	and	using	a	section	of	the	NTA	which	was	intended	for	use	by	claim	communities.	
Using	 the	 term	 ‘one’	 as	 the	 pronoun	 for	 the	 company,	 the	 lawyer	 explained:	 ‘To	 replace	
Applicants,	one	applies	to	the	Federal	Court	for	an	order	that	one	or	more	of	the	applicants	be	
replaced:	 see	 s66B	of	 the	NTA’.	Although	FMG	wanted	a	 fast	 resolution	of	 the	 issues	with	 the	
Nyiyaparli,	the	lawyer	outlined	an	aggressive	and	ambitious	litigation	strategy	that,	while	being	
more	 time	 consuming,	 would	 have	 the	 benefit	 of	 wearing	 down	 the	 PNTS.	 He	wrote	 that	 he	
favoured	 seeking	 admission	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 Expedited	 List	 to	 obtain	 an	 accelerated	
hearing	 date	 because	 this	 action	would	 ‘keep	 up	with	 the	grueling	pace	 [emphasis	 added]	 of	
Supreme	Court	expedited	trial.	Such	pressure	will	 impact	PNTS	ability	 to	organise	themselves	
over	coming	weeks.	It	will	be	interesting	to	see	whether	they	have	the	resources	to	actually	run	
the	case’	(unpublished	correspondence	dated	31	August	2005;	held	by	author).	
	
FMG‐Yindjibarndi	negotiations	
In	 2007,	 as	 the	 negotiations	 between	 the	 two	 parties	 were	 reaching	 a	 crucial	 stage,	 YAC	
appointed	 37‐year‐old	 Michael	 Woodley	 as	 its	 new	 Chief	 Executive.	 Woodley	 is	 a	 highly	
articulate	 individual,	despite	having	 left	school	at	sixth	grade,	and	he	has	consistently	 taken	a	
rights‐based	 approach	 to	 the	 dispute.	 He	 personifies	 the	 community’s	 experience	 with	 the	
mining	 industry	 over	 the	past	 40	years.	His	mother	 Susie	was	one	 of	many	 young	Aboriginal	
women	in	 the	region	who	became	a	 teenage	mother	as	a	result	of	a	brief	 liaison	with	a	white	
mine	worker.	Michael	Woodley	has	never	known	his	 father	and	was	raised	by	his	grandfather	
Woodley	King	who,	 along	with	 other	 elders,	 educated	 him	 in	 traditional	 law.	Despite	 gaining	
employment	 in	 the	mining	 industry,	Michael	Woodley	subsequently	 chose	 to	work	 in	 cultural	
preservation	 through	 the	 Juluwarlu	Aboriginal	 Corporation	 that	 he	 founded	 in	 1999	with	 his	
wife	Lorraine	Coppin,	before	becoming	Chief	Executive	of	YAC.	
	
At	this	time,	part	of	FMG’s	preparations	for	mining	on	Yindjibarndi	country	involved	obtaining	
clearances	under	State	law	for	Indigenous	heritage.	The	Western	Australian	Aboriginal	Heritage	
Act	1972	has	 two	key	sections	 that	are	designed	 to	 facilitate	development	 that	 impacts	on,	or	
destroys,	 Aboriginal	 heritage.	 However,	 in	 order	 to	 do	 this,	 developers	 need	 to	 obtain	 the	
involvement	and	consent	of	Aboriginal	parties.	To	 this	end,	 in	2007	YAC	agreed	 to	undertake	
heritage	surveys	in	accordance	with	the	Yindjibarndi	Heritage	Agreement.	It	began	identifying	
areas	that	should	be	protected	from	development.	In	June	that	year	FMG	negotiated	a	‘Contract	
for	Services	in	Relation	to	Exploration’	with	YAC,	the	agent	for	the	Yindjibarndi	Applicant	to	the	
#1	Native	Title	Claim.	However,	 the	relationship	broke	down	when	FMG	mine	clearance	work	
destroyed	an	identified	heritage	site.	YAC	then	refused	to	submit	to	FMG’s	expedited	approach	
to	heritage	clearances.	
	
In	 early	 2008,	while	 the	dispute	over	heritage	 surveys	was	ongoing,	 FMG	 commenced	 formal	
negotiations	 for	 a	 land	 access	 agreement	 covering	 Yindjibarndi	 country.	 In	 terms	 of	 financial	
wherewithal,	the	disparity	between	the	two	entities	could	not	have	been	greater.	In	the	2007‐08	
financial	 year,	 YAC	 reported	 income	of	 $115,705,	whereas	FMG	earned	 gross	 income	of	 $201	
million	and	reported	a	trading	profit	of	$72	million.	
	
In	 a	meeting	 attended	 by	 Chairman	 Andrew	 Forrest	 on	 10	March	 2008,	 FMG	 again	 pursued	
what	it	called	a	‘Whole	of	Claim	Land	Access	Agreement’	which	involved	YAC	granting	‘any	and	
all	 tenure	desired	by	FMG’	 for	 an	unspecified	project	 (Irving	2011:	13).	 In	 some	ways,	 FMG's	
claims	about	its	extensive	landholdings	in	the	Pilbara	indicated	that	it	was	trading	in	real	estate	
as	much	as	iron	ore.	YAC	responded	to	the	ambitious	claim	by	paraphrasing	the	UN	Declaration	
Paul	Cleary:	Native	Title	Contestation	in	Western	Australia’s	Pilbara	Region	
	
IJCJ&SD			142	
Online	version	via	www.crimejusticejournal.com																																																																																						©	2014	3(3)	
on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Indigenous	 Peoples.	 It	 said	 that	 in	 return	 for	 the	 free,	 prior	 and	 informed	
consent	 of	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 People,	 FMG	 should	 pay	 YAC	 an	 ‘un‐capped’	 5	 per	 cent	 royalty,	
equivalent	to	the	royalty	paid	to	the	state	government.	At	this	meeting,	Forrest	declared	native	
title	 did	 not	 equate	 to	 property	 rights	 and	 therefore	 native	 title	 parties	were	 not	 entitled	 to	
compensation	 (Irving	 2011:	 9).	 This	 line	 of	 argument	 has	 been	 used	 inconsistently	 by	 senior	
FMG	executives	in	their	background	briefings	to	third	parties.	However,	some	years	later	in	July	
2012,	FMG	applied	to	the	Federal	Court	to	be	joined	as	a	respondent	party	to	the	Yindjibarndi	
#1	 Native	 Title	 Claim,	 on	 the	 grounds	 that	 it	 faced	 a	 compensation	 liability	 if	 the	 claim	
succeeded	(NC	(deceased)	v	State	of	Western	Australia	[2012]	FCA	773).		
	
At	 a	 negotiation	 session	 in	Roebourne	 on	 10‐12	 June	 2008	 (that	 is,	 subsequent	 to	 the	March	
2008	 meeting),	 FMG	 was	 represented	 by	 land	 access	 manager	 Blair	 McGlew	 while	 YAC	 was	
represented	 by	 its	 directors	 and	 elders,	 along	with	 a	 large	 number	 of	 YAC	members.	 At	 this	
meeting	 FMG	again	proposed	 a	 ‘Whole	 of	 Claim	Land	Access	Agreement’	with	 YAC;	 in	 return	
YAC	would	receive	an	upfront	signature	payment	of	$250,000,	plus	$2	million	in	training	and	a	
further	$3	million	as	a	capped,	un‐indexed	royalty	(YAC	2008).	YAC	repeated	 its	request	 for	a	
royalty	of	5	per	cent.	FMG’s	representatives	claimed	the	request	amounted	to	extortion.	A	video	
recording	 of	 this	 meeting	 made	 by	 YAC	 shows	 that	 FMGs’s	 chief	 negotiator	 Blair	 McGlew	
responded	to	 the	request	with:	 ‘[t]hat	number	 is	extortionally	 [sic]	high,	 it’s	way	beyond,	 it	 is	
probably	10	times	higher	than	any	other	number’.	Later	in	the	day	McGlew	explained	how	such	
a	 royalty	was	 completely	 inconsistent	with	 the	 approach	 taken	 by	 FMG	 in	 its	 intent	 to	 drive	
down	costs	to	the	bare	minimum:	
	
FMG	wants	 to	be	 the	 lowest	 cost	 iron	ore	producer—that's	 our	 goal,	 that’s	our	
number	one	goal	out	 there.	And	we	recognise	 that	we	don’t	pay	quite	 the	same	
money	as	some	other	companies,	so	we	have	put	our	energy	and	focus	into	other	
areas,	 and	 that	 is	 employment	 support	 and	 business	 support.	 (McGlew	 in	 YAC	
2008)	
	
When	asked	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 statement	 in	a	2011	 interview,	Andrew	Forrest	 said	McGlew's	
comments	did	not	apply	to	Indigenous	settlements.	Rather,	Forrest	thought	that:		
	
…	he	was	 referring	 to	 the	mining	costs	 and	operating	and	shipping	costs	Kerry	
[O’Brien,	the	interviewer].	It's,	I	mean	we're	not	the	lowest	cost	when	it	comes	to	
Aboriginal	 involvement	 and	 we	 are	 one	 of	 the	 most	 expensive	 ...	 We	 do	 want	
always	our	overall	cost	to	be	as	competitive	as	possible,	it	is	how	we	can	survive	
as	an	 independent	Australian	company.	The	 line	 I	would	 like	 to	draw	 in	 that	 is	
when	it	comes	to	Aboriginal	contribution	in	[sic]	 Indigenous	involvement	we've	
always	gone	way,	way	beyond	the	call	of	duty.	(Forrest,	in	Four	Corners	2011)	
	
However,	 at	 the	 June	2008	meeting,	McGlew	made	clear	 that,	 if	YAC	did	not	accept	 the	 terms	
offered	 by	 FMG,	 the	 company	 would	 use	 considerable	 legal	 leverage	 to	 get	 its	 way.	 And	 he	
justified	 this	 approach	by	saying	 the	company	was	 in	a	 rush	 to	develop,	declaring:	 ‘Fortescue	
will	 always	 use	 legal	 avenues	 to	 get	 our	mining	 leases	 and	 roads	 and	whatever	 else.	 I'm	 not	
going	to	hide	that.	We	will	do	that	every	time,	because	we	are	in	a	hurry,	in	a	rush’	(McGlew	in	
YAC	2008).	
	
Subsequently,	 in	 late	 2008,	 YAC	 reduced	 its	 ask	 to	 a	 2.5	 per	 cent	 royalty,	 in	 line	 with	 the	
percentage	paid	to	mining	heiress	Gina	Rinehart	in	her	private	company’s	arrangement	with	Rio	
Tinto.	And	finally,	as	iron	ore	prices	climbed	above	more	than	$150	a	tonne,	YAC’s	request	fell	
back	to	the	industry	standard	for	Pilbara	iron	ore	of	0.5	per	cent	of	the	production	value	(Irving	
2011:	15)	A	consistent	comment	by	FMG’s	negotiators	 in	response	to	these	requests	was	 that	
‘Aboriginal	people	can’t	handle	that	kind	of	money’	(Irving	2012:	15).	Interestingly,	at	no	point	
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did	 the	 company	 offer	 to	 pay	 money	 into	 a	 trust	 fund	 so	 that	 savings	 could	 be	 prudently	
managed	and	made	available	for	future	generations.		
	
FMG’s	penultimate	offer	was	limited	to	a	cash	settlement	–	not	even	indexed	for	inflation	–	of	$4	
million	 a	 year	 over	 the	 life	 of	 the	mine.	 It	 added	 $6.5	million	 a	 year	 in	 unspecified	 jobs	 and	
training	 benefits,	 even	 though	 such	 outlays	 could	 be	 construed	 as	 tax	 deductible	 business	
expenses.	And,	significantly,	FMG	offered	the	inducement	of	a	$500,000	signature	fee	to	secure	
the	agreement.	Negotiations	remained	stalemated	until	FMG	used	the	global	 financial	crisis	 in	
late	2008	as	a	catalyst	for	making	an	even	lower	cash	offer	to	YAC,	even	though	it	was	telling	its	
shareholders	that	a	strong	recovery	in	China	was	underway.	It	offered	a	signature	payment	of	
$245,000	and	an	annual	payment	of	$2.1	million.	
	
These	fixed	dollar	amounts	are	very	modest	compared	to	industry	practice	in	the	Pilbara	region.	
Based	 on	 Rio	 Tinto	 and	 BHP	 Billiton	 settlements	 and	 FMG’s	 planned	 production	 levels5,	 the	
Yindjibarndi	people	might	have	benefitted	from	an	income	stream	of	at	least	$30	million	a	year,	
with	a	 substantial	 share	of	 these	payments	paid	 into	a	 trust	 fund	which	would	 fund	business	
development	 and	 scholarships,	 while	 leaving	 a	 share	 for	 future	 generations.	 The	 FMG	 offer	
therefore	amounted	to	about	one	tenth	of	potential	arrangements.	
	
FMG	put	the	same	offer	back	on	the	table	in	December	2009,	and	again	in	January	2010,	before	
then	 asking	 YAC	 to	 arrange	 a	 community	 meeting	 so	 that	 it	 could	 be	 satisfied	 that	 all	
Yindjibarndi	people	were	aware	of	 this	offer.	 In	February	2010,	FMG	negotiator	Blair	McGlew	
raised	the	prospect	of	organising	his	own	community	meeting,	and	then	circulated	throughout	
Roebourne	 the	 ‘Yindjibarndi‐Fortescue	 Information	 Paper’.	 This	 paper	 said	 YAC	 was	 asking	
‘way	too	much’	and	FMG	would	go	to	NNTT	to	secure	its	mining	licences.	FMG’s	assertion	that	
the	 company	was	 not	 required	 to	 pay	 compensation	were	 repeated	with	 the	 statement	 that:	
‘[u]nder	the	law,	no	financial	compensation	is	payable	to	Yindjibarndi	if	the	leases	are	granted	
in	this	way’.	
	
On	6	July	2010,	McGlew	convened	a	meeting	in	Roebourne	of	Yindjibarndi	people	to	discuss	job	
opportunities	and	work	on	heritage	surveys	in	the	Solomon	area.	According	to	attendees,	FMG	
lawyer	Alexa	Morcombe	and	McGlew	 focused	 instead	on	 the	negotiations	and	 the	prospect	of	
YAC	 securing	a	 favourable	outcome.	The	 conveners	 told	 the	 attendees	 that	 there	was	no	way	
that	YAC	could	win	in	court	and	that	they	should	accept	the	FMG	offer.	YAC’s	chances	were	‘all	
over	 rover’,	 was	 how	 Yindjibarndi	 elder	 Bigali	 Hanlon	 interpreted	 their	 comments	 (personal	
interview,	11	April	2011).	Hanlon	added:	‘FMG	told	people	at	that	meeting	on	Tuesday	that	they	
have	lost	their	court	case,	and	you	can’t	do	anything.	That	gave	people	the	understanding	that	
their	only	hope	was	to	do	heritage	surveys’	(Hanlon	2011).	Another	attendee	added:	‘We	didn't	
understand	what	was	going	on	in	the	Tuesday	meeting.	I	was	there.	I	thought	they	were	offering	
jobs	 for	people.	 Put	 you	names	down	here,	write	down	everyone	who	might	be	 interested	 in	
work.	Now	I	see	that	we	were	being	tricked’	(Irving	2011:	17)		
	
As	with	the	earlier	Nyiyaparli	negotiations,	FMG’s	strategy	also	involved	applying	a	barrage	of	
litigation	and	administrative	procedures	against	YAC,	which	subsequently	 included	a	Supreme	
Court	 action	 to	 have	 YAC	wound	up,	 and	 a	 Federal	 Court	Action	 to	 have	 the	members	 of	 the	
Applicant	 for	 the	 native	 title	 claim	 replaced.	 These	 demands	 drove	 YAC’s	 sole	 legal	 counsel	
George	 Irving	 to	 exhaustion	and	 reinforced	a	perception	 in	 the	 community	 that	 there	was	no	
point	 in	 resisting	 the	 company.	 The	 extent	 of	 legal	 contestation	 from	2009	onwards	between	
YAC	and	FMG	and	the	FMG‐funded	WMYAC	is	shown	in	Table	1.	
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Table	1:	Legal	and	administrative	proceedings	between	YAC	and	FMG/WMYAC	 for	 the	Solomon	
Hub	
Date	 Matter	 Case	reference	
2009	 	 	
24	April	 Determination	of	NIGF	re	mining	lease	M47/1413 [2009]	NNTTA	38
23	June	 Granting	of	mining	leases	M471409/1411 [2009]	NNTTA	63
13	August	 Granting	of	M47/1411 [2009]	NNTTA	91
2010	 	 	
14	May	 Mining	Warden	upholds	YAC	objections [2010]	WAMW	15
2	July	 FCA	dismisses	YAC	appeal	against	3	leases [2010]	FCA	690
26	October	 FCA	dismisses	FMG's	application	for	costs [2010]	FCA	1154
25	November	 FCA	dismisses	YAC	applic.	to	stay	grant	of	leases [2010]	FCA	1305
29	November	 NNTT	upholds	objection	to	grant	of	E47/1818	to	FMG [2010]	NNTTA	194
2011	 	 	
1	April	 FCA	orders	YAC	to	pay	FMG	costs	on	stay	applic. [2011]	FCA	305
17	June	 NNTT	affirms	NIGF	over	M47/1431	and	awards	lease [2011]	NNTTA	107
12	August	 Full	Federal	Court	dismisses	YAC	appeals	against	3	leases [2011]	FCAFC	100
18	August	 Mining	Warden	dismisses	YAC	objection	to	four	misc.	leases	
and	M47/1453	
[2011]	WAMW	13
29	November	 Injunction	against	YAC	holding	its	AGM [2011]	WASC	354
2012	 	 	
7	February	 NNTT	dismisses	YAC	objection to	grant	of	E47/1319 [2012]	NNTTA	11
17	February	 State	Administrative	Tribunal	dismisses	YAC	objection	to	
deletion	of	conditions	on	leases	
[2012]	WASAT31
	
2	July	 FCA	allows	FMG	to	be	joined	as	a	party	to	Yindjibarndi	
native	title	claim	
[2012]	FCA	773
2013	 	 	
12	February	 FCA	affirms	YAC	application	to	replace	members	of	the	
Applicant	
[2013]	FCA	70
Pending	 Application	in	Supreme	Court	of	WA	to	appoint	a	
receiver/manager	to	YAC		
	
	
The	splinter	group	emerges	
Following	 unsuccessful	 attempts	 by	 FMG	 to	 again	 secure	 YAC	 involvement	 in	 heritage	
clearances,	the	Wirlu‐murra	Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	Corporation	(WMYAC)	was	registered	with	
the	Federal	 government’s	Office	of	 the	Registrar	of	 Indigenous	Corporations	on	23	November	
2010.	 Its	 stated	 purpose	was	 to	 provide	 ‘health	 and	 community	 services’	 to	 the	 Yindjibarndi	
people.	Fifteen	days	later,	it	became	clear	that	the	real	aim	of	WMYAC	was	to	replace	YAC	and	
the	members	of	the	Applicant	to	the	native	title	claim.	A	Notice	of	Meeting	in	the	Pilbara	News	(8	
December	2010)	informed	Yindjibarndi	members	of	a	meeting	to	be	held	at	the	‘50	Cent	Hall’	in	
Roebourne	on	21	December	with	the	aim	of	securing	a	vote	to	discontinue	all	legal	resistance	to	
FMG.	 The	 meeting	 was	 proposed	 by	 three	 of	 seven	 members	 of	 the	 Applicant	 for	 the	
Yindjibarndi	 #1	 Native	 Title	 Claim,	 Aileen	 Sandy,	 Mavis	 Pat	 and	 Sylvia	 Allen	 (Pilbara	 News	
2010).	The	agenda	proposed	that:		
	
 YAC	discontinue	two	Federal	Court	appeals.	
 All	objections	made	under	 the	Mining	Act	1978	(WA)	on	behalf	of	 the	Yindjibarndi	#1	
Native	 Title	 Claim	 members	 against	 FMG’s	 Solomon	 Hub	 project	 land	 tenure	 be	
withdrawn.	
 All	objections	made	under	the	NTA	on	behalf	of	the	Yindjibarndi	#1	Native	Title	Claim	
members	against	FMG’s	Solomon	Hub	project	land	tenure	be	withdrawn.	
 The	Yindjibarndi	#1	Claim	applicants	give	consent	to	any	mining	tenement	applications	
by	FMG	Pilbara	Pty	Ltd	or	other	FMG	entities	which	affect	land	within	the	Yindjibarndi	
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#1	Native	Title	Claim	and	which	are	the	subject	of	application	under	s.	35	of	the	Native	
Title	Act	1993	(Cth).	
 The	Yindjibarndi	#1	Native	Title	Claim	applicants	immediately	proceed	to	finalise	a	land	
access	agreement	with	Fortescue	Metals	Group	Ltd,	FMG	Pilbara	Pty	Ltd	and	other	FMG	
entities	in	terms	approved	by	the	majority	of	the	claim	group	membership.	
	
This	meeting	broke	down	amid	acrimony	but	in	March	2011	WMYAC	called	another	meeting	to	
replace	the	members	of	the	Applicant,	which	was	attended	by	FMG	Chairman	Andrew	Forrest.	
This	 tactic	would	have	succeeded	had	YAC	not	 taken	 the	 initiative	and	matched	 this	 effort	by	
calling	 its	 own	 s.66	 (b)	 meeting	 a	 year	 later,	 in	 March	 2012.	 YAC	 then	 joined	 WMYAC’s	
application	 to	 the	 Federal	 Court	 and	 became	 known	 as	 the	 ‘Replacement	 Applicant'.	 In	 a	
separate	avenue	of	 legal	pressure	on	YAC,	FMG	funded	and	initiated	an	action	in	the	Supreme	
Court	 of	 Western	 Australia	 to	 have	 an	 administrator	 appointed	 to	 YAC.	 FMG	 provided	
substantial	 funding	 to	 WMYAC	 for	 both	 the	 Federal	 and	 Supreme	 Court	 challenges.	 For	 the	
2011‐12	 financial	year,	WMYAC	reported	gross	 revenue	of	$8.5	million	and	net	assets	of	$3.6	
million	(WMYAC	2013)	The	main	source	of	revenue	was	described	in	the	notes	to	the	accounts	
as	 ‘services’	 income	which	 included	 $1.6	million	 from	 FMG	 in	 addition	 to	 $2.98	million	 from	
other	 services,	 and	 $1.79	 million	 as	 survey	 income.	 WMYAC's	 single	 biggest	 outlay	 was	 on	
consulting	expenses,	which	totaled	$2.1	million,	with	about	half	of	this	spent	on	legal	expenses.	
	
On	12	February	2013	the	Federal	Court’s	Justice	McKerracher	issued	his	judgment	on	replacing	
the	Applicant.	He	declined	to	 first	consider	the	resolutions	passed	at	 the	March	2011	meeting	
staged	 by	WMYAC/FMG	because	he	 declared	 that	 this	meeting	would	be	made	 redundant	 by	
YAC’s	 s66b	 March	 2012	 meeting	 (FCA	 70,	 9‐10).	 McKerracher	 dismissed	 the	 validity	 of	 the	
WMYAC	 meeting	 with	 a	 deft	 touch.	 He	 said	 that	 had	 the	 opposition	 to	 YAC’s	 authorisation	
meeting	been	successful,	then	of	course	he	would	have	considered	the	2011	meeting.	But	given	
this	was	 not	 the	 case,	 then	 ‘the	 2011	meeting	 arguments	 fall	 away’	 (NC	 (deceased)	 v	State	of	
Western	 Australia	 (No	 2)	 [2013]	 FCA	 70	 [13]).	 The	 preparation	 undertaken	 by	 YAC	 for	 the	
March	 2012	 meeting	 and	 the	 procedure	 at	 the	 meeting	 was	 described	 by	 McKerracher	 as	
’particularly	thorough’.	He	noted	that	the	evidence	given	about	the	preparation	for	the	meeting	
and	the	procedure	at	the	meeting	went	unchallenged.	He	concluded:	
	
The	 2012	meeting	was	 entirely	 professional,	 balanced	 and	 careful.	 There	 is	 no	
technical	 reason	 why	 the	 Replacement	 Applicant	 should	 not	 succeed	 in	 their	
application	and	the	potential	disharmony	between	the	two	groups	 is	something	
which	is	unlikely	to	be	resolved	simply	by	refusing	the	application.	For	all	those	
reasons,	 I	 am	 satisfied	 that	 the	 Replacement	 Applicant	 should	 succeed	 in	 its	
application.	(FCA	70:	[106])	
	
After	five	years	of	fighting	on	numerous	legal	fronts	in	various	courts	and	tribunals	the	decision	
proved	 to	be	 a	huge	moral	 victory	 for	YAC.	 Chief	Executive	Michael	Woodley	 argued	 that	 the	
Federal	 Court	 had	 provided	 the	 Yindjibarndi	 people	with	 the	 ‘safety	 net’	 that	 it	 needed.	 The	
decision	meant	 that	 the	people	would	 ‘not	be	denied	our	place	within	 this	nation’s	 legislative	
laws	because	a	mining	company	thinks	it	knows	best’	(Woodley	2013).	The	victory	owed	a	great	
deal	to	the	tenacious	approach	taken	by	Michael	Woodley	and	George	Irving.	Despite	this	win,	
FMG	has	continued	to	give	substantial	funding	to	WMYAC	and	has	maintained	a	Supreme	Court	
Action	 to	 have	 a	 receiver	 appointed	 to	 YAC.	 It	 now	 appears	 that	 about	 40	 per	 cent	 of	
Yindjibarndi	people	side	with	WMYAC	so	it	may	only	be	a	matter	of	time	before	FMG	prevails	
and	replaces	YAC	with	WYAC.	However,	under	YAC’s	constitution,	directors	can	only	be	installed	
with	unanimous	support.	
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Conclusion	
After	 six	 years	 of	 costly	 resistance	 and	 wrangling	 through	 the	 courts	 and	 the	 tribunal,	 FMG	
began	mining	on	 land	claimed	by	 the	Yindjibarndi	people	under	 the	Native	Title	Act	1993	and	
registered	 with	 the	 National	 Native	 Title	 Tribunal	 but	 without	 paying	 compensation	 to	 the	
Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	Corporation.	The	Solomon	Hub’s	Firetail	mine	has	produced	almost	20	
million	tonnes	of	iron	ore	since	opening	in	May	2013	(FMG	2014),	earning	the	company	around	
$2	billion	 in	 revenue	 alone.	 The	Kings	Deposit,	which	 commenced	operations	 in	March	2014,	
will	boost	annual	production	by	another	40	million	tonnes	and	earn	around	$3.5	billion	a	year	at	
current	 prices.	 Its	 production	 is	 a	 crucial	 part	 of	 the	 company’s	 goal	 of	 reaching	 155	million	
tonnes	per	annum.	Both	mines	sit	squarely	within	the	Yindjibarndi	#1	Native	Title	Claim	and	yet	
FMG	has	been	able	to	access	this	land	without	paying	a	cent	of	compensation.6	
	
This	 dispute	 bears	many	 of	 the	 hallmarks	 identified	 by	 Australian	 and	 international	 scholars	
and	 UN	 officials,	 most	 notably	 former	 UN	 Special	 Rapporteur	 on	 the	 Rights	 of	 Indigenous	
Peoples	 James	Anaya,	about	the	 injustices	experienced	by	Indigenous	or	marginalised	peoples	
generally,	and	especially	when	mineral	riches	are	involved	(Anaya	2011).	Beyond	the	legalities	
of	the	dispute,	it	seems	patently	unfair	that	the	people	whose	land	is	contributing	to	the	nation’s	
single	biggest	source	of	export	revenue	(Bingham	and	Perkins	2012)	remain	mired	in	poverty.	
Because	of	the	high	living	costs	associated	with	regions	where	the	mining	industry	is	dominant,	
including	for	basics	such	as	food	and	shelter,	Indigenous	people	in	the	Pilbara	face	even	greater	
economic	 disadvantages	 than	 those	 experienced	 by	 other	 Indigenous	 Australians	 and	 low	
income	groups.	Even	more	unjust	is	the	fact	that	corporate	interests	are	able	to	use	the	justice	
system	to	achieve	this	end.	
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1	This	 research	was	carried	out	while	 the	author	was	a	doctoral	 candidate	at	 the	Centre	 for	Aboriginal	
Economic	 Policy	 Research	 at	 the	 Australian	 National	 University,	 Canberra.	 Conferral	 of	 his	 PhD	 is	
scheduled	for	late	December	2014.	
2	 All	 figures	 are	 in	 Australian	 dollars.	 This	 estimate	 is	 based	 on	 the	 10‐year	 average	 price	 of	 $90	 per	
tonne,	using	figures	from	The	Steel	Index	(see	https://www.thesteelindex.com/).	
3	Figure	obtained	from	NNTT's	website	using	 ‘search	the	register	&	applications’	 function,	which	yields	
this	number	of	determinations	each	with	their	own	unique	Tribunal	file	number.	
4	Daniel	v	Western	Australia	[2005]	FCA	536	(2	May	2005)	at	18	states	that:	‘The	Yindjibarndi	Aboriginal	
Corporation	 is	 to	 hold	 the	 native	 title	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 the	 Yindjibarndi	People	 in	 trust	 for	 the	
Yindjibarndi	People’.		
5	FMG	planned	to	mine	60	million	tonnes	of	iron	ore	a	year	from	the	Solomon	Hub,	which,	at	an	average	
forward	price	of	$100	a	tonne,	would	amount	to	$6	billion	of	revenue	a	year.	If	production	rose	to	100	
million	tonnes	–	which	potential	FMG	had	flagged	in	shareholder	presentations	–	revenue	would	lift	to	
$10	billion	a	year,	and	a	higher	iron	ore	price	assumption	would	take	this	amount	even	higher.		
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6	While	the	Solomon	mine	is	wholly	within	the	claim	area,	one	of	the	leases	for	the	Kings	mine	overlaps	
74.35	per	cent	of	the	area,	and	a	second	overlaps	4.98	per	cent.	FMG	has	said	the	mine	is	solely	within	
the	 Eastern	Gurama	determination	 area	 because	 it	 has	 an	 Indigenous	 Land	Use	Agreement	with	 this	
group,	but	it	often	fails	to	mention	the	Yindjibarndi	interest	perhaps	because	it	has	no	such	agreement.   
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